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	<title>Comments on: Network Segmentation</title>
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	<link>http://pciguru.wordpress.com/2009/02/15/network-segmentation/</link>
	<description>A common sense approach to achieving PCI compliance and retaining your sanity</description>
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		<title>By: Network Segmentation – Take 2 &#171; PCI Guru</title>
		<link>http://pciguru.wordpress.com/2009/02/15/network-segmentation/#comment-248</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Network Segmentation – Take 2 &#171; PCI Guru]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 06 Mar 2010 12:24:20 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[[...] recently regarding what constitutes good network segmentation.  Apparently, my original post was just too cryptic, so I’m going to use some examples in this post to hopefully clarify where [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] recently regarding what constitutes good network segmentation.  Apparently, my original post was just too cryptic, so I’m going to use some examples in this post to hopefully clarify where [...]</p>
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		<title>By: PCIGuru</title>
		<link>http://pciguru.wordpress.com/2009/02/15/network-segmentation/#comment-50</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[PCIGuru]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2009 23:51:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pciguru.wordpress.com/?p=34#comment-50</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Encryption such as with a VPN is also a form of network segmentation.  Another possible solution is Kerberos which can create encrypted communications between devices and processes if properly configured.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Encryption such as with a VPN is also a form of network segmentation.  Another possible solution is Kerberos which can create encrypted communications between devices and processes if properly configured.</p>
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		<title>By: Johnson Yenu</title>
		<link>http://pciguru.wordpress.com/2009/02/15/network-segmentation/#comment-49</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Johnson Yenu]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2009 09:32:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pciguru.wordpress.com/?p=34#comment-49</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The network segmentation aims to create a trust boundary between payment systems and non-payment systems. What if this is done at a non-network level, e.g. with encryption, where non-payments systems cannot get hold of the decryption keys unless they compromise the thing doing the encryption, in which case the game is up, much like if the firewall is compromised in the network segregation example.

For e.g. if there is a DB doing DB-level encryption of data, with a per-DB encryption key, using public-private pairs managed by an Active Directory domain. A compromise of one server will not reveal the data unless the DB is also compromised, which will mean the machine will need to be compromised at an administrator level, and even then that compromise will not allow the other DB&#039;s to be owned unless the domain admin account is compromised. Thus, there is a &#039;trust boundary&#039; between payment systems and connected systems. Would that count as descoping?

Thanks,
Johnson]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The network segmentation aims to create a trust boundary between payment systems and non-payment systems. What if this is done at a non-network level, e.g. with encryption, where non-payments systems cannot get hold of the decryption keys unless they compromise the thing doing the encryption, in which case the game is up, much like if the firewall is compromised in the network segregation example.</p>
<p>For e.g. if there is a DB doing DB-level encryption of data, with a per-DB encryption key, using public-private pairs managed by an Active Directory domain. A compromise of one server will not reveal the data unless the DB is also compromised, which will mean the machine will need to be compromised at an administrator level, and even then that compromise will not allow the other DB&#8217;s to be owned unless the domain admin account is compromised. Thus, there is a &#8216;trust boundary&#8217; between payment systems and connected systems. Would that count as descoping?</p>
<p>Thanks,<br />
Johnson</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: QSA Consistency &#171; PCI Guru</title>
		<link>http://pciguru.wordpress.com/2009/02/15/network-segmentation/#comment-11</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[QSA Consistency &#171; PCI Guru]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 11 Apr 2009 13:52:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pciguru.wordpress.com/?p=34#comment-11</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] segmentation is another area that is up for interpretation.  I have stated in my Network Segmentation post that, “I know good network segmentation when I see it.”  However, from class this week, [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] segmentation is another area that is up for interpretation.  I have stated in my Network Segmentation post that, “I know good network segmentation when I see it.”  However, from class this week, [...]</p>
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