Archive for the 'Requirement 8 – Facilitate secure network implementation' Category

01
Mar
19

Will The Council Kill Off TLS?

On February 6, 2019, a technical paper was published regarding a new attack on TLS 1.2 and 1.3 had been identified.  Of course, the first thing that a lot of us wondered was, “Will the PCI SSC now kill off TLS 1.2 and 1.3?”

Before panic sets in, I am guessing that TLS 1.2/1.3 will not go away like SSL v3 and TLS 1.0/1.1 did before.  The reason is that this is just another variation of the Bleichenbacher attacks that seem to crop up every so often regarding SSL and TLS.  What is different about this attack is the new side-channel leak approach that was used.

The risk in this attack is best described from the researchers’ technical paper.

 “… even though  the  use  of  RSA  in  secure  connections  is  diminishing (only ≈6% of TLS connections  currently  use  RSA  [1,  51]), this  fraction  is  still  too  high  to  allow  vendors  to  drop  this mode.  Yet,  as  we  show  in  Section  VI,  supporting  this  small fraction of users puts everyone at risk, as it allows the attacker to perform a downgrade attack by specifying RSA as the only public key algorithm supported by the server.”

The problem is all related to the use of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 in TLS.  The rest of protocol is just fine.  So, at worst case I could see the Council recommending that RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 not be allowed to be used.

Which reminds me of years ago when the US banking regulators came out and stated that by a certain date, Internet Explorer 6 would no longer be allowed to be used for internet banking.  According to the banks at the time, such a move by the regulators would create a support nightmare or, even worse, kill off internet banking.  However, the date came, the banks turned off IE6 and little happened.  Yes, there were a few days of higher than normal support calls about customers not being able to get into their accounts, but those quickly died off.

The issue with RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 is similar to the banking story.  At what point do we draw the line on these sorts problems?  10% of users?  2% of users?  1% of users?  In this case, 6% of the internet users are putting the remaining 94% at risk.  Is it worth it?  Each organization will have to determine if that risk is acceptable and justify why.

31
Oct
15

SSL Is Not Going To Go Quietly

A lot of organizations are finding out that just turning off SSL is just not an option. This is particularly true of merchants running eCommerce sites predominantly used by mobile customers or customers running older operating systems. To the surprise of a lot of IT people, it turns out that most mobile browsers do not support using TLS. And while most Western PC users have reasonably current browser software, the rest of the world does not and turning off SSL will remove a significant portion of some merchant’s customer base. As a result, for some organizations going “cold turkey” on SSL is just not an option without suffering significant consequences.

But there is a larger problem with SSL lurking inside almost every data center. That is with appliances and data center management software that have SSL baked into them for their Web-based management interfaces. A lot of vendors availed themselves of OpenSSL and other open source SSL solutions to secure communications with their appliances and solutions. To remediate these solutions, an organization might be lucky enough to upgrade the firmware/software. Unfortunately, a lot of organizations are finding that replacement is the only option offered by vendors to address these situations.

The bottom line is that because of these situations, SSL and early TLS will not be addressed by just disabling it and moving on. As the PCI SSC found out when they asked Qualified Security Assessor Companies and Participating Organizations about what it would take to address the SSL/early TLS situation, they were told about these issues and therefore set a deadline of June 30, 2016 to provide time to address these situations.

While organizations have until June 30, 2016 to address SSL and early TLS, that does not mean an organization can just sit by and do nothing until that deadline. Here are some things your organization should be doing to address SSL and early TLS if you are unable to just turn it off.

  • Get a copy of NIST Special Publication 800-52 Revision 1 titled ‘Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations’. This publication is the Bible for how to minimize and mitigate the risks of SSL and early TLS.
  • Identify all instances of where SSL or TLS are used and versions supported. It is not just those instances that need to be remediated, but all instances. The reason is that TLS v1.3 is in draft specification and its release is likely just around the corner in 2016. That is why a complete inventory is needed so that when TLS v1.3 is available you will know what remaining instances will potentially need to be updated, upgraded or possibly even replaced.
  • Implement TLS-FALLBACK-SCSV to minimize the chance of SSL/TLS fallback. This option was developed to address the issue created by POODLE. However, be aware that only certain versions of browsers support this option, so it is not a perfect solution.
  • Monitor your external Web sites for SSL and early TLS usage. Track statistics of how many sessions are using SSL or early TLS so that you can determine usage of those protocols and therefore know the actual impact of any decision regarding those protocols. These statistics will also allow you to know when you might be able to pull the plug on SSL and early TLS with minimal impact.
  • Modify any external Web sites to present a message to anyone using SSL or early TLS to warn them that you will be no longer supporting SSL/early TLS as of whatever date your organization chooses to drop that support.
  • Where possible, configure the Web site to only use SSL or early TLS as the absolute last resort. Unfortunately, a lot of vendors modified their SSL solution to not allow this sort of change so do not be surprised if that does not become an option.
  • Develop a migration plan for your remaining instances where SSL or early TLS are used. Contact vendors involved and document what their plans are for dropping SSL and early TLS.
  • Be prepared to create compensating controls for SSL and early TLS that you will not be able to remediate by the deadline. Unfortunately, I have a sneaking suspicion that some vendors will miss the June 30, 2016 deadline as will some merchants be unable to turn off SSL by the deadline. As a result, those organizations will have to put compensating controls in place to maintain PCI compliance. These compensating controls will likely be messy and complex as enhanced monitoring will likely be the only controls available.
24
Jul
11

End-To-End Encryption – The Rest Of The Story

Step right up folks.  I have something that will cure all of your problems with credit card processing.  It is called end-to-end encryption.  Yes, folks, it is the be all, to end all in security.  It will cure all that ails you, particularly those nasty data breaches.  Don’t be shy, just step right up and get your own version while supplies last.

Gee, when end-to-end encryption (E2EE) is put that way, it sounds great, almost too good to be true.  And you would be right; it is too good to be true.  But if you listen to the statements of the proponents of E2EE, they make it sound like once E2EE is in place, it is like the Ronco Showtime Oven, “Just set it and forget it.”

Now, do not get me wrong.  E2EE is not a bad thing, but it does have its own set of risks.  And it is those risks that do not get discussed that concern me.  The reason for my concern is that if you discuss E2EE with any merchant, most see it as this panacea, something that will get them out of the PCI compliance game altogether.  However, nothing could be further from the truth.  If anything, E2EE may make PCI compliance even more daunting than it is today.

The first thing everyone seems to forget is that E2EE only removes those systems and networks that are between the endpoints.  That is because the data stream between the endpoints is encrypted and, therefore, out of scope for PCI compliance.  However, for a merchant, that means that the device that accepts the credit card is still in-scope for PCI compliance.  Bring this fact up to most merchants and they start complaining like no tomorrow.

That device might be as “simple” as a credit card terminal or as complex as an integrated point-of-sale (POS) workstation on a network.  However, since this device is an endpoint, the merchant or the merchant’s QSA needs to ensure that the endpoint is properly secured and cannot end up being a breach point.  Depending on the complexity of that device, that assessment might be very straight forward or very time consuming.  The reason the endpoint needs to be assessed is that security is only as good as its weakest link.  In the case of E2EE, the weakest links are the endpoints at which the data is encrypted and decrypted.

The next thing that seems to slip people’s mind is that fact that since the merchant has an endpoint, that endpoint is still a target.  Worse yet, because it is an endpoint, the level of sophistication likely required to compromise that endpoint goes up exponentially, meaning that any successful attack will likely be beyond the average merchant’s capability to readily detect.  The PCI DSS addresses this threat fairly well by requiring network monitoring, daily log reviews, anti-virus, anti-malware, firewalls and the like.  However, I can tell you from personal experience that your average merchant is not going to be equipped to deal with this new threat.

And what is the new threat?  The new threat is tampered with hardware and software.  If you think this is farfetched, think again.  It has already happened on a limited scale.  The doctoring of hardware is fairly straight forward to both accomplish and to detect.  Detection only takes looking inside the device and noticing something that does not belong.  However, doctored software is another story.  The concept of doctored software has been a concern in the health care industry since the start of using computerization for heart pacemakers.  While the health care industry has developed rigorous testing and certification procedures, the rest of the software industry has said there is no need.  That is, until now.  As the world further automates, the need for reliable, safe and secure software only increases because of the reliance people and organizations apply to that software.

So what can an organization do to stem this new threat after implementing E2EE?  Here are some thoughts.

  • Purchase your credit card processing equipment only from your acquiring bank or reputable vendor.  This is not a perfect solution to the problem, but doing this should be better than buying a used unit off of eBay or from Joe’s Guaranteed Card Equipment.  Yes, you may save a few bucks, but is that worth having every one of your customers that uses a credit card being compromised?  Probably not.
  • Ask your supplier of terminals or POS workstations about what they do to test these systems to ensure that they operate as expected and are not routing cardholder data to Timbuktu as well as your bank.  Ask them to provide those procedures in writing and review them to ensure they appear adequate.
  • Use serialized tamperproof tape on the seams and doors of your terminals and POS workstations.  Require that at every Manager shift change the new manager on duty is required to log their review of the devices, inventory the devices and notate if any have been tampered with.  If a device does appear to have been tampered with, it should be taken out of service until a new, secure device can replace it.
  • If using self-checkout systems, make sure to have those systems under both video and employee monitoring.
  • Upgrade your card processing devices to the latest devices.  Over the last few years, some of these devices have seen significant changes in their design that improves their tamper resistance.  This is particularly true of fuel pumps and certain types of terminals.
  • Review video monitoring if any manager notates that a device may have been tampered with to determine if you can identify possible suspects that may have tampered with the device.
  • Patch your devices as soon as possible to minimize their susceptibility to attack or compromise.
  • If the vendor of the equipment will perform updates, make sure that you or someone in your organization schedules the updates.  If anyone shows up at a location to “update” your equipment and it was not scheduled by your organization, contact law enforcement.
  • If updates will be done by the vendor remotely, make sure that someone from your organization initiates the remote access and they observe the remote update process.  At the end of the update process, the person should terminate the remote session of the vendor.

Even implementing these processes will not remove all of the risk.  Particularly the risk of having modified software introduced into your environment.  However, these processes will show a court that you attempted to conduct due diligence and tried to keep your equipment secure.

11
Mar
11

PCI and SOX, HIPAA, GLBA, et.al.

Just got a call regarding PCI and Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) compliance.  Whether it is SOX, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) or some other regulation, organizations that also have to comply with the PCI standards want to maximize the work effort to avoid redundancy.  After all, all of these assessments take a lot of effort to gather the documentation and other supporting materials as well as interviews and the like to go through the various assessments.  It is not that this cannot be done, but it can get complicated to ensure efforts are coordinated properly and assessment work done by one party is acceptable to the QSA and vice versa.  It has been my experience that properly planned, a lot of these other assessment programs can be aligned to minimize the amount of effort required to go through a PCI assessment.  However, be advised that there may still be a significant amount of effort on your QSA’s part as well as your own organization because of the testing required by the PCI DSS.

For example, since the release of SOX there have been a lot of changes, particularly for section 404 where most public companies think they will gain leverage.  What has happened is that with the changes to 404, the number of applications in-scope for SOX has been greatly reduced as has been the testing requirements.  Therefore what is in-scope for SOX is usually a very small subset of what is in-scope for PCI or may not even be relevant to an organization’s PCI compliance.  I know this will seem hard to believe, but we have publicly held clients where their point of sale (POS) is not in-scope for SOX.  As a result, any leverage between SOX and PCI efforts is not always possible.

But that is not to say there are not areas where leverage can be obtained.  One place where we typically get leverage is with the assessment of logical access controls, PCI DSS requirements 7 and 8.  Since most companies have a central directory for managing users such as Microsoft Active Directory, logical access controls get fairly well covered under SOX, HIPAA or GLBA.  As such, an organization’s internal audit function and/or external auditors have covered how users are added/changed/disabled/deleted, password aging, password strength, etc.  There may still be areas that were not covered such as password resets, but there is no reason to go back over what has already been covered if that was already assessed and the parameters of their assessment meets or exceed the PCI DSS requirements.  In most cases, we find that the assessment by the other party typically goes above and beyond what the PCI DSS requires.

Another area we find where leverage can be gained is with application development standards, PCI DSS requirement 6.3, and change control, PCI DSS requirement 6.4.  Both of these areas get quite a bit of scrutiny under SOX, HIPAA and Federal Financial Institution Examination Council (FFIEC) regulations as well as most organizations’ internal audit work programs.  Granted, these various assessment efforts will not cover every application or device in-scope for PCI.  However most organizations have common policies, standards and procedures for application develop and change control and those will have been assessed and tested under other assessments.  These assessments should be able to be leveraged and minimize a QSA’s testing to in-scope PCI items that were not tested as part of other assessment efforts.  Again, in most cases, we find that the assessments of these areas go above and beyond what the PCI DSS requires.

Caveats

Now before everyone runs joyously off to limit their QSA’s review activities, there are some caveats that need to be considered in order for this to be effective.

First and foremost of all of these caveats is that it is up to the QSA to be willing to accept the other parties’ work efforts in assessing the requirement in question.  The PCI SSC has made it clear that a QSA is under no obligation to accept any third party’s assessment efforts, even another QSA’s.  As a result, just because you have these other assessments does not mean that you will gain anything in your PCI assessment.  Which leads me to recommend that when you are assessing QSAs for your PCI compliance work, it is a good idea to ask them about whether or not they will accept other third parties’ assessment work?  You cannot leverage the results of these other assessments if the QSA will not cooperate.

Another caveat is that the assessment efforts from any third party must have occurred within the PCI assessment period.  No one should expect a QSA to rely on a work product that did not occur during the PCI assessment period.  I have run into situations where, because of timing, the assessment of logical access occurred a few months prior to the PCI assessment time period and would not be re-assessed by the organizations until a month after the PCI assessment period.  In those cases, we have had to conduct our own testing of logical access controls and could not leverage the other auditor’s work.  I also have had run into instances where the assessment of a particular control occurred right at the start of the PCI assessment period.  Because almost a year had passed, we opted to conduct some limited testing of the control to ensure that the control was still functioning as designed but did not conduct our full testing because of the results of the prior testing.

A third caveat is that the QSA needs to be careful in determining what was covered by the third party in their assessment.  Not that we have had organizations trying to put one over on us, but as a QSA you really need to read the third party’s report and, if necessary, ask questions about the scope of the assessment.  We have found in a number of instances that what was represented by our client and the work performed by the third party were not the same.  The reason this occurs is that what we (QSA) asked for; what our client contact then asked for; what the person who has the report supplied; do not always jive with what we (QSA) were expecting or requested.  As a result, it is not unusual to have to go a couple of iterations to get what we need.  And even then we may find out that what we can get will not meet our needs.

The final caveat is that the third party must be qualified to conduct the testing you are going to rely upon.  This is similar to the requirement that the PCI SSC tells QSAs about for internal vulnerability scanning and penetration testing.  Per my earlier example, if an organization’s external auditor has done testing regarding how users are established and assigned access to the network and applications, there is little to be gained from a QSA going through the same exhaustive testing.  As an employee of a public accounting firm, I can tell you that SOX testing is not a small effort in regards to logical access.  So unless the logical access testing totally missed the cardholder data environment, I would typically have no trouble relying on the external auditor’s assessment.

So there are ways to leverage other compliance efforts to reduce the impact of PCI compliance work.  In order to leverage all of these efforts, quite a bit of planning and coordination are required.  And just because you can do this, does not automatically mean that the leverage gained outweighs the effort required to make it happen.  So you need to keep in mind that such efforts may be for naught.




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May 2022
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